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INTRODUCTION
W HAT is the purpose of a corporation? To many people, the answer to
this question seems obvious: corporations exist to make money for
their shareholders. Maximizing shareholder wealth is the corporation's only
true concern, its raison d'etre. Devoted corporate officers and directors should
direct all their efforts toward this goal.
Some find this picture of the corporation as an engine for increasing
shareholder wealth to be quite attractive. Nobel Prize-winning economist
Milton Friedman famously praised this view of corporate purpose in his 1970
New York Times essay, "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits."' To others, the idea of the corporation as a relentless profit-seeking
machine seems less appealing. In 2004, Joel Bakan published The Coooration:
The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power, a book accompanied by an award-
winning documentary film of the same name. 2 Bakan's thesis is that corpora-
tions are indeed dedicated to maximizing shareholder wealth, without regard
to law, ethics, or the interests of society. Thus, as Bakan argues, corporations
are "dangerously psychopathic" entities.3
Whether viewed as cause for celebration or for concern, the idea that
corporations exist only to make money for shareholders is rarely subject to
challenge. Although there is a tradition of scholarly debate among legal
academics on this point, it has attracted little attention outside the pages of
specialized journals. 4 Much of the credit, or perhaps more accurately the blame,
for this state of affairs can be laid at the door of a single judicial opinion: the
1919 Michigan Supreme Court decision in Dodge v. FordMotor Compan;.]
I. D ODGE V. FORD ON CORPORATE PURPOSE
The facts underlying Dodge v. Ford are familiar to virtually every student
who has taken a course in corporate law. Famed industrialist Henry Ford was
1. Milton Friedman, The Social Reyonsibiil of Business If to Incrase ts Profts, N.Y. TnMEs
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 33.
2. JOL BAKAN, T-T CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF PROFIT AND POWER
(2004).
3. Id. at2.
4. See Lynn A. Stout, Bad and \ot-So-Bad A fgwuzfor Shareholder Primag;, 75 S. CAT. L. REv.
1189, 1189-90 (2002) (noting the 1932 Berle-Dodd debate regarding the proper purpose
of the corporation, as well as more modern scholarly disagreement on the subject).
5. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
3:163 (2008)
HeinOnline  -- 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 164 2008
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford
the founder and majority shareholder of the Ford Motor Comparn.6 Brothers
John and Horace Dodge were minorint investors in the firm.7 The Dodge
brothers brought a lawsuit against Ford claiming that he was using his control
over the company to restrict dividend payouts, even though the company was
enormously profitable and could afford to pay large dividends to its
shareholders.8 Ford defended his decision to withhold dividends through the
provocative strategy of arguing that he preferred to use the corporation's
money to build cheaper, better cars and to pay better wages. 9 The Michigan
Supreme Court sided with the Dodge brothers and ordered the Ford Motor
Company to pay its shareholders a special dividend.10
In the process, the Michigan Supreme Court made an offhand remark
that is regularly repeated in corporate law casebooks today:
There should be no confusion .... A business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the
stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be em-
ployed for that end. The discretion of the directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does
not extend to ... other purposes."
As will be discussed in greater detail below, this was merely judicial dicta,
quite unnecessary to reach the court's desired result. Nevertheless, this
quotation from Dodge v. Ford is cited almost invariably as evidence that
corporate law requires corporations to have a "profit maximizing purpose" 12
and that "managers and directors have a legal duty to put shareholders' interests
above all others and no legal authority to serve an other interests . ".'..
Indeed, Dodge v. Ford is routinely employed as the onj legal authority for this
proposition. 14
6. Id. at 671.
7. Id. at 670.
8. Id. at 670 71.
9. Id. at 671.
10. Id. at 685.
11. Id. at 684.
12. ROBERT CHARLES CLYRK, CORPORAITE LAW 678 (1986).
13. BAI\AN, supra note 2, at 36.
14. See, e.g., id.; CLAYRr, supra note 12, at 679; MARJORIE KELLY, THE DINqNE RIGHT OF
CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE CORPORATE ARiSTOCRACY 52 53 (2001); Lawrence E.
3:163 (2008)
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But what if the opinion in Dodge v. Ford is incorrect? What if the Michigan
Supreme Court's statement of corporate purpose is a misinterpretation of
American corporate doctrine? Put bluntly, what if Doge v. Ford is bad law?
This Essay argues that Dodge v. Ford is indeed bad law, at least when cited
for the proposition that the corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing
shareholder wealth. Dodge v. Ford is a mistake, a judicial "sport," a doctrinal
oddity largely irrelevant to corporate law and corporate practice. What is
more, courts and legislatures alike treat it as irrelevant. In the past thirty years,
the Delaware courts have cited Dodge v. Ford as authorint in only one
unpublished case, and then not on the subject of corporate purpose, but on
another legal question entirely.15
Only laypersons and (more disturbingly) many law professors continue to
rely on Dodge v. Ford. This Essay argues we should mend our collective ways.
Legal instructors and scholars should stop teaching and citing Dodge v. Ford. At
the least, they should stop teaching and citing Dodge v. Ford as anything more
than an example of how courts can go seriously astray.
II. DODGE V. FORD AS WEAK PRECEDENT ON
CORPORATE PURPOSE
Let us begin with some of the more obvious reasons why legal experts
should hesitate before placing much weight on Dodge v. Ford. First, the case is
approaching its one hundredth anniversary. Henry Ford, John Dodge, and
Horace Dodge have long since died and turned to dust, along with the
members of the Michigan Supreme Court who heard their dispute. In fact,
Dodge v. Ford is the oldest corporate law case selected as an object for study in
most corporate law casebooks. This observation should provoke concern, for
case law is a bit like wine: a certain amount of aging is desirable, but after too
many years it goes bad-and it is a rare vintage that is still drinkable after a
century. Why rely on a case that is nearly one hundred years old if there is
more modern authority available?
A second odd feature of Dodge v. Ford is the court that decided it. The
state of Delaware-not Michigan-is far and away the most respected and
Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Iramework for Eqforing Coiporate Costituenc S tatutes, 70
TEX. L. REV. 579, 601 (1992).
15. See Blackwell v. Nixon, Civ. A. No. 9041, 1991 WL 194725, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 26,
1991).
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influential source of corporate case law, a fact that reflects both Delaware's
status as the preferred state of incorporation for the nation's largest public
companies and the widely recognized expertise of the judges on the Delaware
Supreme Court and Delaware Court of Chancery. California and New York
have produced their share of influential corporate law cases, as has Massachu-
setts with regard to close corporations. Michigan, however, is a distant also-
ran in the race among the states for influence in corporate law. 16
Finally, a third limiting aspect of Dodge v. Ford as a source of legal author-
ity on the question of corporate purpose is the important fact, noted earlier,
that the Michigan Supreme Court's statements on the topic were dicta. The
actual holding in the case-that Henry Ford had breached his fiduciary duty
to the Dodge brothers and that the company should pay a special dividend-
was justified on entirely different and far narrower legal grounds. Those
grounds were that Henry Ford, as a controlling shareholder, had breached his
fiduciary duty of good faith to his minority investors.1 1
As the majority shareholder in the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford
stood to reap a much greater economic benefit from any dividends the
company paid than John and Horace Dodge did. Ford had other economic
interests, however, directly at odds with those of the Dodge brothers. First,
because the Dodge brothers wished to set up their own car company to
compete with Ford (as they eventually did), Ford wanted to deprive them of
liquid funds for investment.'8 Second, Ford wanted to buy out the Dodge
brothers' interest in the Ford Motor Company (as he eventually did) at the
lowest price possible. Withholding dividends from the Dodge brothers was an
excellent, if underhanded, strategy for accomplishing both objectives. 9
16. See Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeoer Statutes on Incoiporation Choice: Eidence
on the 'ace" Debate andAntitakeoer O'erreacling, 150 U. PY. L. RV. 1795 (2002).
17. See Dodge '. Ford, 170 N.W. at 685; see also Einer Elhauge, Sarifieing Coiporate Prfits in the
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REN. 733, 772 75 (2005) (explaining why profit maximization
proponents' reliance on Doge z'. Ford is misplaced); Nathan Oman, Coiporations andAuton
oT Theories of Contract: A Citique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DEN. U. L. RENT. 101, 135
36 (2005) ("Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled for the Dodge brothers not
because of some generalized dut to maximize shareholder value, but rather, because of
the right of dissenting minority shareholders to be free from unreasonable oppression.");
D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy, Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 320 (1998) ("The
court did not think it was enunciating a meta principle of corporate law. Rather, the court
thought it was merely deciding a dispute between majority and minority shareholders in a
closely held corporation ... .
18. See Oman, supra note 17, at 135.
19. See Elhauge, supra note 17, at 774.
3:163 (2008)
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Thus Dodge v. Ford is best viewed as a case that deals not with directors'
duties to maximize shareholder wealth, but with controlling shareholders'
duties not to oppress minority shareholders. The one Delaware opinion that
has cited Dodge v. Ford in the last thirty years, Blackwell v. Nixon, cites it for just
this proposition.2'
Finally, not only is the Michigan Supreme Court's statement on corporate
purpose in Dodge v. Ford dicta, but it is much more mealy-mouthed dicta than
is generally appreciated. As Professor Einer Elhauge has emphasized, the
Michigan Supreme Court described profit-seeking in Dodge v. Ford as the
"primary," but not the exclusive, corporate goal.21 Indeed, elsewhere in the
opinion the court noted that corporate directors retain "implied powers to
carry on with humanitarian motives such charitable works as are incidental to
the main business of the corporation. '22
III. THE LACK OF AUTHORITY FOR DODGE V. FORD's
POSITIVE VISION OF CORPORATE PURPOSE
Dodge v. Ford suffers from several deficiencies as a source of legal prece-
dent on the question of corporate purpose. The case is old, it hails from a
state court that plays only a marginal role in the corporate law arena, and it
involves a conflict between controlling and minorimt shareholders that
independently justifies the holding in the case while rendering the opinion's
discourse on corporate purpose judicial dicta. Nevertheless, one might still
defend the continued teaching and citing of Doge v. Ford if the discussion of
corporate purpose found in the case were an elegant, early statement of a
modern legal principle.
Here we run into a second problem: shareholder wealth maximization is
not a modern legal principle. To understand this point, it is important not to
rely on the unsupported assertions of journalists, reformers, and even the
occasional law professor as sources of legal authority, but instead to look at
the actual provisions of corporate law. "Corporate law" can itself be broken
down into three rough categories: (1) "internal" corporate law (that is, the
requirements set out in individual corporations' charters and bylaws); (2) state
corporate codes; and (3) corporate case law.
20. B/ackwell, 1991 WL 194725, at *4.
21. Elhauge, supra note 17, at 773 (quoting Doge '. Ford, 170 N.W. at 684).
22. Id.
3:163 (2008)
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Let us first examine internal corporate law, especially the statements of
corporate purpose typically found in corporate charters (also called "articles
of incorporation"). Most state codes permit, or even require, incorporators to
include a statement in the corporate charter that defines and limits the
purpose for which the corporation is being formed. If the corporation's
founders so desire, they can easily include in the corporate charter a recitation
of the Dodge v. Ford view that the corporation in question "is organized and
carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. ' 23 In reality, corporate
charters virtually never contain this sort of language. Instead, the typical
corporate charter defines the corporate purpose as anything "lawful. '24
What about state corporation codes? Do they perhaps limit the corporate
purpose to shareholder wealth maximization? To employ the common saying,
the answer is "not just 'no,' but 'hell no."' A large majorit of state codes
contain so-called other-constituency provisions that explicitly authorize
corporate boards to consider the interests of not just shareholders, but also
employees, customers, creditors, and the community, in making business
decisions. 25 The Delaware corporate code does not have an explicit other-
constituency provision, but it also does not define the corporate purpose as
shareholder wealth maximization. Rather, section 101 of the General
Corporation Law of Delaware simply provides that corporations can be
formed "to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes. '26
This leaves case law as the last remaining hope of a Dodge v. Ford sup-
porter who wants to argue that, as a positive matter, modern legal authority
requires corporate directors to maximize shareholder wealth. On first
inspection, corporate case law does provide at least a little hope. Contempo-
rarT judges do not cite Dodge v. Ford, but some modern cases contain dicta that
echo its sentiments. Consider, for example, the Delaware Chancery's
statement in the 1986 case of Katz v. Oak Industries that "[i]t is the obligation
of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of
the corporation's stockholders .... ",27
23. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 684.
24. SeeJEFFREY D. BAUMAN, AT AN R. PALTTTER, AND FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONs LAW
AND POLICY: MATRIALS AND PROBLEMS 171 (6th ed. 2007).
25. See Mitchell, sulpra note 14, at 579-80 (describing the statutes); id. at 579 n.1 (listing the
tventy-eight jurisdictions having a constituency statute at the time of publication).
26. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2008).
27. Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
3:163 (2008)
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This statement is about as Dodge v. Ford-like a description of corporate
purpose as one can hope to find in contemporary case law. Many other
modern cases, however, contain contrary dicta indicating that directors owe
duties beyond those owed to shareholders. For example, just a year before the
Delaware Court of Chancery decided Kat, the Delaware Supreme Court
handed down its famed decision in Unocal Coooration v. Mesa Petroleum
Compa&y.28 In Unocal, the court opined that the corporate board had a
"fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which
includes stockholders," 29 a formulation that clearly implies the two are not
identical. 30 The court went on to state that in evaluating the interests of "the
corporate enterprise," directors could consider "the impact on 'constituencies'
other than shareholders (that is, creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps
even the communit generally)." 31
Just as important, even shareholder-oriented dicta on corporate purpose
of the Kath sort does not actually impose any legal obligation on directors to
maximize shareholder wealth. The key to understanding this is the qualifying
phrases "attempt" and "long-run." As a number of corporate scholars have
pointed out, courts regularly allow corporate directors to make business
decisions that harm shareholders in order to benefit other corporate
constituencies. 32 In the rare event that such a decision is challenged on the
grounds that the directors failed to look after shareholder interests, courts
shield directors from liabilit under the business judgment rule so long as any
plausible connection can be made between the directors' decision and some
28. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
29. Id. at 954.
30. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theo oCoporate law, 85 V,. L.
REN. 247, 293-94, 301 (1999) (arguing that directors should be viewed as owing fiduciary
duties to the corporation itself, in addition to any duties they might owe to shareholders,
and that duties to the company can include non-shareholder interests).
31. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
32. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 12, at 681-84 (noting the difficulty of establishing any long-run
difference between public and private interests); Blair & Stout, supra note 30, at 303
(giving examples of how modern corporate law departs from "the norm of shareholder
primacy" and noting that "case law interpreting the business judgment rule often explicitl
authorizes directors to sacrifice shareholders' interests to protect other constituencies");
Elhauge, supra note 17, at 763-76 (describing corporate discretion to refrain from legal
profit-maximizing activity); Lisa M. Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Rea,,esi&g the
Scope Directon' Fiduciar Oblgatio~n in For-Profit Coporations with Non-Shareholder Beneficiaies,
59 WA\Si. & LE L. REN. 409, 437-39 (2002) (identifying doctrine that allows a corpora-
tion's directors to consider other interests at the expense of the shareholder).
3:163 (2008)
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possible future benefit, however intangible and unlikely, to shareholders. If
the directors lack the imagination to offer such a "long-run" rationalization
for their decision, courts will invent one.
A classic example of this judicial eagerness to protect directors from
claims that they failed to maximize shareholder wealth can be found in the
oft-cited case of Shlensky v. Wgl. 33 In Shlensy, minority investors sued the
directors of the corporation that owned the Chicago Cubs for refusing to
install lights that would allow night baseball games to be played at Wrigley
Field.34 The minorint investors claimed that offering night games would make
the Cubs more profitable. 35 The corporation's directors refused to hold night
games, not because they disagreed with this economic assessment, but
because they believed night games would harm the quality of life of residents
in the neighborhoods surrounding Wrigley Field.36 The court upheld the
directors' decision, reasoning, as the directors themselves had not, that a
decline in the quality of life in the local neighborhoods might in the long run
hurt property values around Wrigley Field, harming shareholders' economic
interests.3
Shlensky illustrates how judges routinely refuse to impose any legal obliga-
tion on corporate directors to maximize shareholder wealth. Although dicta in
some cases suggest directors ought to attempt this (in the "long run," of
course), dicta in other cases take a broader view of corporate purpose, and
courts never actually sanction directors for failing to maximize shareholder
wealth.
There is only one exception to this rule in case law: the Delaware Su-
preme Court's 1986 opinion in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc.38 Revlon is a puzzling decision, not least because the Delaware Supreme
Court decided the case the same year it handed down its apparently contradic-
tory decision in Unocal. In Rev/on, the board of a public company had decided
to take the firm private by selling all of its shares to a controlling share-
holder.39 In choosing between potential bidders, the board considered, along
33. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (I1. App. 1968).
34. Id. at 777.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 778.
37. Id. at 780.
38. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
39. Id. at 177 79.
3:163 (2008)
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with shareholders' interests, the interests of certain noteholders in the firm.40
This was a mistake, the Delaware Supreme Court announced; where the
company was being "broken up" and shareholders were being forced to sell
their interests in the firm to a private buyer, the board had a duty to maximize
shareholder wealth by getting the highest possible price for the shares.41
Upon first inspection, Rev/on appears to affirm the notion that maximizing
shareholder wealth is the corporation's proper purpose. In the years following
the Revlon decision, however, the Delaware Supreme Court has systematically
cut back on the situations in which Rev/on supposedly applies, to the point
where any board that wants to avoid being subject to Rev/on duties now can
easily do so. The case has become nearly a dead letter. Accordingly, while the
Delaware Supreme Court has not explicitly repudiated Revlon (at least not yet),
for practical purposes the case is largely irrelevant to modern corporate law
and practice.4 2
In sum, whether gauged by corporate charters, state corporation codes, or
corporate case law, the notion that corporate law as a positive matter
"requires" companies to maximize shareholder wealth turns out to be
spurious. The offhand remarks on corporate purpose offered by the Michigan
Supreme Court in Doge v. Ford lack any foundation in actual corporate law.
IV. THE LACK OF AUTHORITY FOR DODGE V. FORD'S
NORMATIVE VISION OF CORPORATE PURPOSE
Doge v. Ford usually plays the role of Exhibit A for commentators seeking
to argue that American law imposes on corporate directors the legal
obligation to maximize profits for shareholders. 43 It is important to recognize,
however, that many experts teach and cite Dodge v. Ford in a more subtle, and
less obviously erroneous, fashion. To these experts, Dodge v. Ford is not
evidence that corporate law actually requires directors to maximize share-
holder wealth. Rather, many observers believe it is evidence that corporate
directors ought to maximize shareholder wealth. In other words, many legal
instructors teach Doge v. Ford not as a positive description of what corporate
40. Id. at 178 79.
41. Id. at 182.
42. See Stout, supra note 4, at 1204.
43. See BAUMAN FT AT., spra note 24, at 87.
3:163 (2008)
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law actually is, but as a normative discourse on what many believe the proper
purpose of a well-functioning corporation should be.
This is a far more defensible position. Nevertheless, the switch from
using Doge v. Ford as a source of positive legal authority to using Doge v. Ford
as a source of normative guidance carries its own hazards. Most obviously, it
begs the fundamental question of what the proper purpose of the corporation
should be.
It is not enough to state that Dodge v. Ford represents an important per-
spective on corporate purpose simply because many people believe it
represents an important perspective on corporate purpose. This argument
borders on tautology (that is, "Dodge v. Ford is influential because people think
Doge v. Ford is influential"). Perhaps many people do share the Michigan
Supreme Court's view that it is desirable for corporations to pursue only
profits for shareholders. But why do they believe this is desirable?
At least until fairly recently, many corporate experts found the answer to
this question in economic theory. Not too long ago, it was conventional
economic wisdom that the shareholders in a corporation are the sole residual
claimants in the firm, meaning shareholders are entitled to all the "residual"
profits left over after the firm has met its fixed contractual obligations to
employees, customers, and creditors. This assumption suggests that corpora-
tions are run best when they are run for shareholders' benefit alone, because if
other corporate stakeholders' interests are fixed by their contracts, maximizing
the shareholders' residual claim means maximizing the total social value of the
firm.
44
Time has been unkind to this perspective. Advances in economic theory
have made clear that shareholders generally are not, and probably cannot be,
the sole residual claimants in firms. For example, modern options theory
teaches that business risk that increases the expected value of the equity
interest in a corporation must simultaneously reduce the supposedly "fixed"
value of creditors' interests. 45 Another branch of the economic literature
focuses on the contracting problems that surround specific investment in
"team production," suggesting how a legal rule requiring corporate directors
44. See Stout, supra note 4, at 1192 95 (critiquing the residual claimants argument for
shareholder primacy).
45. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountabl/j and the Mediating Role of the
Coiporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 411-14 (2001). Sguneral Thomas A. Smith, ibe
Effl;ent Noiifor Coporate law: A Neotraditional [nteretation of Fiduniag, Dulo, 98 MiCH. L.
REN. 214 (1999).
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to maximize shareholder wealth ex post might well have the perverse effect of
reducing shareholder wealth over time by discouraging non-shareholder
groups from making specific investments in corporations ex ante.46 Yet a
third economic concept that undermines the wisdom of shareholder wealth
maximization is the idea of externalities: when the pursuit of shareholder
profits imposes greater costs on third parties (for instance, customers,
employees, or the environment) that are not fully constrained by law,
shareholder wealth maximization becomes undesirable, at least from a social
perspective. 47
Finally, it is becoming increasingly well-understood that when a firm has
more than one shareholder, the very idea of "shareholder wealth" becomes
incoherent. 48 Different shareholders have different investment time frames,
different tax concerns, different attitudes toward firm-level risk due to
different levels of diversification, different interests in other investments that
might be affected by corporate activities, and different views about the extent
to which they are willing to sacrifice corporate profits to promote broader
social interests, such as a clean environment or good wages for workers.
These and other schisms ensure that there is no single, uniform measure of
shareholder "wealth" to be "maximized."
Accordingly, most contemporary experts understand that economic
theory alone does not permit us to safely assume that corporations are run
best when they are run according to the principle of shareholder wealth
maximization. Not only is Dodge v. Ford bad law from a positive perspective,
but it is also bad law from a normative perspective. This gives rise to the
question of how to explain Dodge v. Ford's enduring popularit.
V. ON THE PUZZLING SURVIVAL OF DODGE V. FORD
Simple inertia may provide an answer, to some extent. Corporate law
casebooks have included excerpts from Dodge v. Ford for generations, and it
would take a certain degree of boldness to depart from the tradition. But there
is more going on here than inertia. Casebooks change, but Dodge v. Ford
remains. This suggests Dodge v. Ford has achieved a privileged position in the
46. See Blair & Stout, supra note 30; Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Spe1.c In'estment and
Coiporate Law, 7 EUR. BuS. ORG. L. REiV. 473 (2006).
47. See Elhauge, supra note 17, at 738 56.
48. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Inc'easiug Shareholder Powe; 53 UCLA. L. REV.
561 (2006).
3:163 (2008)
HeinOnline  -- 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 174 2008
Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford
legal canon, not because it accurately captures the law (as we have seen, it
does not) or because it provides good normative guidance (again, we have
seen it does not), but because it serves law professors' needs.
In particular, Doge v. Ford serves professors' pressing need for a simple
answer to the question of what corporations do. Law professors' desire for a
simple answer to this question can be analogized to that of a parent con-
fronted by a young son or daughter who innocently asks, "Where do babies
come from?" The true answer is difficult and complex and can lead to further
questions about details of the process that may lie beyond the parent's
knowledge or comfort level. It is easy to understand why many parents faced
with this situation squirm uncomfortably and default to charming fables of
cabbages and storks. Similarly, professors are regularly confronted by eager
law students who innocently ask, "What do corporations do?" It is easy to
understand why professors are tempted to default to Dodge v. For and its
charming and easily understood fable of shareholder wealth maximization.
After all, explaining the true purpose of corporations is even more chal-
lenging and uncertain than explaining reproduction. From a positive
perspective, public corporations are extraordinarily intricate institutions that
pursue complex, large-scale projects over periods of years or even decades.
They have several directors, dozens of executives, hundreds or thousands of
employees, thousands or hundreds of thousands of shareholders, and possibly
millions of customers. Corporations resemble political nation-states with
multiple constituencies that have different and conflicting interests, responsi-
bilities, obligations, and powers. Indeed, the very largest corporations (such as
Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil, or Microsoft) have greater economic power than
many nation-states do. These are not institutions whose behavior can be
accurately captured in a sound bite.
The problem of explaining proper corporate purpose is just as off-putting
from a normative perspective. Even the seemingly simple directive to
"maximize shareholder wealth" becomes far less simple and perhaps
incoherent in a public firm with many shareholders with different investment
time frames, tax concerns, outside investments, levels of diversification, and
attitudes toward corporate social responsibility. The normative question of
what corporations ought to do becomes even more daunting when the answer
involves discussions of avoiding externalities, maximizing the value of returns
to multiple residual claimants, and encouraging specific investment in team
production.
Faced with this reality, it is entirely understandable why a legal instructor
or legal scholar called upon to discuss the question of corporate purpose
might be tempted to teach or cite Dodge v. Ford in reply. Despite its infirmities,
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Dodge v. Ford at least offers an answer to the question of corporate purpose
that is simple, easy to understand, and capable of being communicated in less
than ten minutes or ten pages. It is this simplicity that has allowed Doge v.
Ford to survive over the decades and to keep a place-however undeserved-
in the canon of corporate law.
CONCLUSION
Simplicity is not always a virtue. In particular, simplicity is not a virtue
when it leads to misunderstanding and mistake.
It might be perfectly fine for a Midwestern farmer to believe the world is
flat. Although this simple model of the world is inaccurate, it is easy to
understand and apply, and its inaccuracy is of no consequence for someone
who travels only rarely and in short distances. A simple model of a flat world,
however, might prove catastrophically inaccurate for a ship captain attempting
to navigate from one continent to another. For the ship captain, a more
complicated model that acknowledges the globe's spherical shape is essential
to avoid disaster.
When it comes to corporations, lawyers are ship captains. Corporations
are purely legal creatures, without flesh, blood, or bone. Their existence and
behavior is determined by a web of legal rules found in corporate charters and
bylaws, state corporate case law and statutes, private contracts, and a host of
federal and state regulations. For lawyers, an accurate and detailed under-
standing of the corporate entity and its purpose is just as essential to success
as an accurate understanding of geography and navigation is to a ship captain,
or an accurate and detailed understanding of brain anatomy and function is to
a neurosurgeon.
This is why lawyers, and especially law professors, should resist the siren
song of Dodge v. Ford. We are not in the business of imparting fables, however
charming. We are in the business of instructing clients and students in the
realities of the corporate form. Corporations seek profits for shareholders, but
they seek others things, as well, including specific investment, stakeholder
benefits, and their own continued existence. Teaching Dodge v. Ford as
anything but an example of judicial mistake obstructs understanding of this
reality.
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INTRODUCTION
JN her delightful and provocative essay, Whj We Should Stop Teaching Dodge
iv. Ford,' Professor Lynn Stout manages simultaneously to make too much
and too little of the famous decision thwarting Henry Ford's apparent effort
to steer the powerful automobile company he controlled away from the
pursuit of profit maximization as the single-minded purpose of the
corporation.
Professor Stout makes too much of the case when she asserts that
"[m]uch of the credit, or perhaps more accurately the blame, for this state of
affairs can be laid at the door of ... the 1919 Michigan Supreme Court
decision in Dodge v. Ford Motor Companj."2 This is wrong, since the Michigan
t Deputy Dean and Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and
Securities Law, Yale Law School.
1. Lynn A. Stout, Whb, We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 V-. L. Bus. REV. 163 (2008).
2. Id. at 164 (citing Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919)).
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Supreme Court is merely the messenger here. As Professor Stout rightly
points out, the Michigan Supreme Court has not innovated much in the world
of corporate governance, 3 and this case is no exception. The court certainly
cannot rightly be credited (or, if Professor Stout is to be believed, blamed) for
inventing the idea that the purpose of the public corporation is to maximize
value for shareholders.
Professor Stout makes too little of the case with her claim that the
opinion is "a mistake, a judicial 'sport,' a doctrinal oddity largely irrelevant to
corporate law and practice." 4 The case is not a doctrinal oddity. Dodge v. Ford
still has legal effect, and is an accurate statement of the form, if not the
substance, of the current law that describes the fundamental purpose of the
corporation. By way of illustration, the American Law Institute's ("ALI")
Princjples of Coioorate Governance ("Principles"),5 considered a significant, if not
controlling, source of doctrinal authority, are consistent with Dodge v. Ford's
core lesson that corporate officers and directors have a duty to manage the
corporation for the purpose of maximizing profits for the benefit of
shareholders. Specifically, section 2.01 of the Princjples makes clear that "a
corporation should have as its objective the conduct of business activities
with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain."'6
Significantly, the Principles specify that the goal of the corporation is
shareholder wealth maximization. According to Professor Mel Eisenberg,
Reporter for the ALI's Principles of Corporate Governance Project,
shareholder wealth maximization is used because "the market is usually more
accurate" and is less susceptible to manipulation than other measures of
corporate performance. 7  Moreover, the ALI expressly emphasizes
shareholder wealth rather than corporate wealth, and specifically excludes
labor interests as something that should be maximized, contrary to Professor
Stout's apparent preferences on this matter.8
The Principles contain only three rather minor exceptions to the
shareholder wealth maximization norm. Corporations can ignore shareholder
wealth maximization in order to: (1) comply with the law; (2) make charitable
3. Id. at 167 (citing Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeo'er Statutes on Incolporation
Choice: Evidence on the 'Race" Debate and Antitakeozer Operreaching, 150 U. PA. L. RnV. 1795
(2002)).
4. Id. at 166.
5. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANC (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPTEs].
6. Id. 2.01.
7. Symposium, Waseda Institute for Corporation Law and Society, A Talk with Professor
Eisenbeig 21, http://www.21coe win cls.org/english/actvit\/Eisenberge.pdf (last visited
Apr. 7, 2008).
8. See id.
3:177 (2008)
HeinOnline  -- 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 178 2008
3:177 (2008) A Close Read of an Excellent Commentay on Dodge v. Ford 179
contributions; and (3) devote a "reasonable amount of resources to public
welfare, humanitarian, educational, and philanthropic purposes." 9 In other
words, the only exceptions permitted to the shareholder wealth maximization
norm are those necessary to ensure that corporations be given sufficient
latitude to act like responsible community members by complying with the
law and supporting charities and other worthy causes.
Professor Stout makes the observation that "[a] large majority of state
[corporation] codes contain so-called other-constituency provisions that
explicitly authorize corporate boards to consider the interests of not just
shareholders, but also employees, customers, creditors, and the community, in
making business decisions."1 )° Professor Stout makes much too much of this
corporate governance factoid. For the sake of completeness, she should have
pointed out that these statutes cannot rationally be construed to permit
managers to benefit non-shareholder constituencies at the expense of
shareholders. Rather, these statutes are mere tie-breakers, allowing managers
to take the interests of non-shareholder constituencies into account when
doing so does not harm shareholders in any demonstrable way.
In this Essay, first I will examine in a bit more detail Professor Stout's
claim that corporations have some purpose other than profit maximization.
Next, I will argue that though she is wrong on the legal doctrine, her
argument contains only a minor, essentially semantic error that reflects a
modest bit of confusion about the legal landscape.
Nevertheless, Professor Stout's excellent essay captures two very
important points about corporate law. First, because the corporation is a
contract-based form of business organization, maximizing shareholder gain is
only a default rule. Shareholders could opt out of this goal if they so desired.
Shareholders, however, have indicated very little, if any, propensity to alter
the application of the default rule that the public companies in which they
invest should do strive to maximize profits on their behalf.
The second important point captured by Professor Stout's essay is that
Doge v. Ford is interesting not because it establishes the proposition that
directors should maximize shareholder wealth as a matter of law, but rather as
a normative discourse on what many believe the proper purpose of a well-
functioning corporation should be."" This observation is meaningful and
important, but incomplete. Professor Stout's assertion that Dodge v. Ford is a
mere normative description of what corporate law ought to be, rather than a
9. PRINCIPLES, supra note 5, § 2.01.
10. Stout, supra note 1, at 169.
11. Id at 173.
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positive account of what corporate law actually is, does not account for the
inconvenient fact that the shareholder maximization ideal actually drives the
holding and is not mere dicta.
Still, Professor Stout invokes an extremely important truth: there are no
cases other than Dodge v. Ford that actually operationalize the rule that
corporations must maximize profits. The goal of profit maximization is to
corporate law what observations about the weather are in ordinary
conversation. Everybody talks about it, including judges, but with the lone
exception of Dodge v. Ford, nobody actually does anything about it.
Next, I will expound on the implications of the fact that shareholder
wealth maximization is widely accepted at the level of rhetoric but largely
ignored as a matter of poicy implementation. In the following section, I will
explain why Doge v. Ford is generally ignored. I will then discuss what I
believe is the most interesting aspect of Doge v. Ford: the implications of the
case from an ethical perspective. Here, I will make the radical and irreverent
assertion that the reason we have never seen, and in all probability will never
see, another case quite like Dodge v. Ford is because CEOs who testify in
depositions and trials are better coached and more willing to dissemble than
Henry Ford was. If other CEOs actually told the truth about how they put
their own private interests ahead of those of the shareholders, the case might
not stand in such splendid isolation.
In the final section, I will take issue with Professor Stout's assertion that
advances in economic thinking have made it clear that shareholders are not
the sole residual claimants in the firm, as well as its implication that corporate
managers should be free to maximize the wealth of all of the corporation's
constituencies and not just the wealth of the shareholders.
I. WHY NOBODY DOES ANYTHING ABOUT DODGE V. FORD
Maximizing value for shareholders is difficult to do. There is no simple
algorithm, formula, or rule that managers can employ to determine what
corporate strategy will maximize returns for shareholders. Competition is fierce.
The world changes quickly. Even extremely dedicated and able managers
preside over business ventures that fail. A strategy that leads to great success in
one venture may result in financial catastrophe in another venture. The world
of business is more than uncertain: it is chaotic and unpredictable.
Thus even though I believe, contrary to Professor Stout, that corporate
law requires directors to maximize shareholder value, I also recognize that it
simply is not possible or practical for courts to discern ex post when a
3:177 (2008)
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company is maximizing value for shareholders and when the officers and
directors are only pretending to do so.
Shareholder wealth maximization, however, is still at least the law on the
books, if not in practice. It is the law, just as it is the law that cars should not
drive more than fifty-five miles per hour on Connecticut's Merritt Parkway.
The speed limit is clearly posted and well understood. In reality, however, it is
extremely rare to locate a car traveling at less than seventy miles per hour, and
eighty miles per hour is closer to the norm. I presume that Professor Stout
would agree with me about what the law says with respect to the speed limit
on the Merritt Parkway.
The lack of any apparent means to enforce the de jure speed limit on the
Merritt Parkway is largely due to the fact that the terrain makes it extremely
difficult to set up speed traps. This, in turn, makes it difficult for the police to
detect wrongdoing. The same is true for the rule of corporate law that
corporate fiduciaries are obligated to maximize profits for shareholders. The
law is clear. It is not merely a "normative discourse," as Professor Stout
argues. 12 The problem is not the lack of clarity of the rule. The problem is
lack of enforceability.
The enforceability problem is exacerbated by hindsight bias. When a
company fails (or simply has deeply disappointed shareholders), it will
inevitably appear that managers were not acting in the shareholders' interests,
even if they were. In fact, because shareholders are residual claimants who
may hold fully diversified portfolios of securities, maximizing profit for
shareholders often requires significant risk-taking. Thus, ironically, companies
that are engaged in shareholder wealth-maximizing, risk-taking activities may
wind up in financial distress. On the other hand, companies that are pursuing
strategies that primarily serve the interests of workers, such as expanding only
to increase market share or acquiring other companies in unrelated fields to
reduce risk, may never become insolvent. However, these strategies often do
not maximize value for shareholders.
II. AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE: How To ADVISE THE CLIENT
The prior discussion raises an interesting question about Dodge v. Ford
itself. If I am correct that the profit maximization rule is so difficult to
enforce as a practical matter, then how did the court in Dodge v. Ford manage
to enforce it? After all, as Professor Stout accurately (though perhaps a bit
bluntly) observes, unlike the Delaware courts, the Michigan courts are not
12. See id.
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exactly known for their expertise or sophistication in matters of corporate
law. 13 Michigan is indeed "a distant also-ran in the race between and among
the states for influence in corporate law."' 14 This is true not only in
comparison with Delaware, but even in comparison with other states, such as
California, New York, Massachusetts, Maryland, and Virginia.
The reason that the Michigan Supreme Court held against Mr. Ford is
simple. Ford gave them no choice when he asserted that he was pursuing
some strategy other than wealth maximization for shareholders. As Professor
Stout observes, Henn, Ford did not acknowledge the validity of the minority
shareholders' claim that the corporation had fiduciary obligations to them.
Rather, Ford "argu[ed] that he preferred to use the corporation's money to
build cheaper, better cars, and to pay better wages."' 15
Henry Ford's frank admission raises an important question. Where was
Henry Ford's lawyer when Mr. Ford was losing the case for himself by
claiming no hint of an obligation to maximize shareholder value? Instead, Mr.
Ford testified that he did not plan to make any dividend payments to the
shareholders, convincing the court that the CEO had "the attitude towards
shareholders of one who has dispensed and distributed to them large gains
and that they should be content to take what he chooses to give."'16
A fascinating thing about Dodge v. Ford, and a compelling reason why it is
an excellent teaching vehicle, is how easy it would have been for Mr. Ford to
have won this case. Suppose Mr. Ford simply had gotten on the stand and
testified (contrary to the truth, apparently) that he was keenly interested in
maximizing value for shareholders. Suppose further that Mr. Ford took the
position (as many CEOs have done) that, in his view, the best way to benefit
the shareholders was to increase the market share of the business, and that
reducing the price of cars was critical to his strategy of expanding the
company. Also suppose that Mr. Ford took the eminently reasonable position
that the company required loyal, experienced, and skilled workers to succeed,
and that his plan to raise wages was necessary to accomplish this end.
In sum, suppose that Mr. Ford simply had testified that his plans were
consistent with the goal of profit maximization for shareholders. As the court
observed in Dodge v. Ford, while corporations are "organized and carried on
primarily for the benefit of the stockholders[,] ... [t]he discretion of the
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end . . . ."17 In
13. Seeid. at 166-67.
14. Id. at 167.
15. Id. at 165 (paraphrasing Dodge z'. Ford, 170 N.W. at 671).
16. Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. at 683.
17. Id. at 684.
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other words, Dodge v. Ford itself stands for the proposition that as long as the
goal of the corporation is profit maximization, the directors have virtually
unfettered discretion to choose the strategies to be employed to that end,
which the court described aptly as "the infinite details of business."18 The
court specifically noted that the issues in the case, including (but presumably
not limited to) employee wages, working hours and conditions, and product
pricing are at the discretion of the directors. 19 Consistent with common
contemporary corporate practice, the court even suggests that declining to
distribute dividends is fine, so long as the retained earnings are used to benefit
the stockholders and not devoted to "other purposes. '20
In other words, what mattered in this case was not what Mr. Ford did,
but what he said he was doing. Mr. Ford said that he was putting the interests
of other constituents ahead of the interests of the shareholders. If he had lied
and said that his motivation was to maximize profits rather than to benefit
workers and other non-shareholder constituencies, he would have won the
case. The court acknowledges that the problem in this case was Mr. Ford's
frank articulation of the motives for his behavior and that of his directors, as
he had attempted to argue that directors' motives are irrelevant, as long as
their actions "are within their lawful powers." '21
The court did not dispute that the actions taken by the directors were
within their lawful powers. The problem the court had was that the directors
attempted to justify their actions by claiming that they were motivated by a
desire to benefit some constituency other than the shareholders. If Henry
Ford had decided to articulate a different, shareholder-centric motivation for
his behavior, he would have prevailed in this litigation.
This raises the interesting question of how Mr. Ford's attorneys might have
better counseled their star witness. The rules of professional responsibility are
dear. Lawyers have a duty to do everything possible to prevent a client from
lying, and they must not knowingly call any witness who plans to lie while
testifying.22 Lawyers who believe that a client is going to give untruthful
testimony are required to take remedial measures, including disclosure to the
tribunal if necessary, rather than permit such conduct in the proceeding.23
Mr. Ford's lawyers had a responsibility not to allow him to lie on the
stand. They certainly had an ethical responsibility not to coach him to do so.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. MODEvL RULFS OF PROF'1 CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2003).
23. Id. at R. 3.3(b).
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Thus, this case tells us something important about the practical ramifications
of the rules of professional conduct, as they may well have been outcome-
determinative. Unless Mr. Ford lied about the motivations for his actions, he
would lose the case.
Suppose, however, that Mr. Ford's lawyers had said something like the
following: "We cannot advise you to lie. In fact, our professional
responsibilities as lawyers require that we insist that you tell the truth. Be
aware, however, that if you insist on testifying that your motivations in
formulating your dividend policy and other corporate strategies are to benefit
your employees and society rather than your company's shareholders, you are
going to lose this case. On the other hand, if you can honestly testify that you
think that what you are doing is in the overall best interest of the Ford Motor
Company and its shareholders, then you should say so, and you will be able to
do as you please regarding salaries, expansion of production facilities, and
product pricing. The plaintiffs will have no chance of winning this case if you
testify that you are doing what you are doing to maximize value for your
company's shareholders."
Mr. Ford, not being a complete idiot, would undoubtedly get the point if it
was presented to him in this fashion, and undoubtedly it would have been. The
more vexing question is whether Mr. Ford's lawyers should have advised Mr.
Ford that the outcome of the case would depend on the way he characterized
his own motives. This is one of the things that make Dodge v. Ford so intriguing.
Because there is no sure way to tell what Mr. Ford's real motives were, it is
impossible to know whether he was lying when he testified, and an unethical
lawyer could have advised Mr. Ford to lie without fear of repercussion.
It would be wonderful to know what advice Mr. Ford's lawyers gave him
before he testified so helpfully for the plaintiffs who were suing him. Perhaps
this case represents the apogee of legal ethics in American law practice.
Perhaps Mr. Ford was not told what the implications of his testimony might
be. Or perhaps Mr. Ford was advised about the implications of his testimony,
and, out of arrogance or pride, decided to tell the truth anyway, in spite of his
lawyers. We will never know, but speculating certainly is fun.
III. RESIDUAL CLAIMS AND PROFIT MAXIMIZATION
Professor Stout challenges the proposition that shareholders are the sole
residual claimants in the firm. 24 Professor Stout thinks that by showing that
shareholders are not the sole residual claimants in a company, she has
24. See Stout, supra note 1, at 173.
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somehow shown that profit maximization for shareholders is a bad idea. In
my view, it is here that Professor Stout begins to err.
The basic problem is that Professor Stout's analysis reflects more than
just a rejection of the goal of shareholder wealth maximization contained in
Doge v. Ford (and elsewhere, including the ALI's Corporate Governance
Project and Delaware's corporate law jurisprudence). It also appears to reject,
at least implicitly, the observation that the modern corporation is a nexus of
contracts. 25  Because the firm is a voluntary organization in which
relationships are characterized by the contracts that define the firm itself, it
would seem that rights, obligations, and power within the firm should be
allocated according to contract. Seen from this perspective, there is a simple
explanation for what the firm does-or, perhaps more accurately, what the
firm should do. The corporation acts (or should act) so as to perform its
obligations under the myriad contracts it has with its various constituents.
At least to me, the default rule is clearly that the corporate contract calls
for the firm to maximize value for shareholders consistent with its other
obligations under the law, as well as to employees, suppliers, customers, and
other firms and individuals with which the firm is in contractual privint. The
goal of profit maximization for shareholders is the law, but it is only a default
rule. If the shareholders and the other constituents of the corporate enterprise
could agree on some other goal for the corporation, then the law clearly
should not interfere. Thus, to the extent that Dodge v. Ford is articulating a
default rule, I believe that the decision was and is correct. To the extent that
Dodge v. Ford purports to reflect a mandatory rule, however, I agree with
Professor Stout that the opinion is not a correct articulation of the law.
Professor Stout claims that "[n]ot too long ago, it was conventional
economic wisdom that the shareholders in a corporation are the sole residual
claimants in the firm, meaning that shareholders are entitled to all the
'residual' profits left over after the firm has met its fixed contractual
obligations to employees, customers, and creditors." 26 Professor Stout is right
to observe that shareholders are not the only residual claimants in the firm. It
would be impossible to prevent workers, customers, suppliers, and other
constituencies (including local communities) from benefiting in many
"residual" ways when the corporation flourishes, and to prevent these
25. For the origins of this concept, see Ronald Coase, iJe Nature of te Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
386 (1937); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theo f t Firm: ManagraI
Behaior, Agenc; Costs, and Ownership St, cture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 310-11 (1976) (noting
that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of
contracting relationships among individuals).
26. Stout, supra note 1, at 173.
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constituencies from being harmed when the corporation is in distress.
Contracting parties often benefit in various ways when their counter-parties
flourish and suffer when their counter-parties fail.
Thus, shareholders are not distinguished by being the only corporate
constituents with residual claims to the profits of the firm. What distinguishes
shareholders is that they are the only claimants to the cash flows of the firm
whose ony economic interests in the firm are residual. This, as Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel pointed out long ago, explains a peculiar feature of
corporate law that Professor Stout conveniently ignores: shareholders, as
residual claimants, almost always have exclusive voting rights in the firm.2
Professor Stout also goes on to claim that "modern options theory
teaches that business risk that increases the expected value of the equity
interest in a corporation must simultaneously reduce the supposedly 'fixed'
value of creditors' interests. '28 This claim is more or less correct, subject to a
couple of important qualifications. First, it is worth noting that under certain
conditions, shifting to new projects can increase the value of shareholders'
interests without reducing the value of the creditors' interests even where
business risk increases.
For example, suppose that a firm with $20 in debt is thinking of shifting
from Project 1, which has an expected value of $54, to investment 2, which also
has an expected value of $54. Project l's expected value of $54 is based on the
assumption that there is a 20% chance the firm will earn $20, a 60% chance that
the firm will earn $50, and a 20% chance that the firm will earn $100 during the
relevant time frame.29 Project 2 also has an expected value of $54, based on the
assumption that there is a 40% chance the firm will earn $20, a 20% chance that
the firm will earn $50, and a 40% chance that the firm will earn $90 during the
relevant time frame.30 Each of these projects provides an expected value of $20
for the firm's fixed claimants and $34 for the firm's equity investors.31
The risk of these two projects can be assessed by comparing the standard
deviation of the two projects. Because the standard deviation of the second
project (66.15) is higher than that of the first project (65.05), the shareholders
might prefer the first project to the second, depending on a host of factors.
27. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Coiporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON.
395 (1983).
28. Stout, supra note 1, at 173.
29. (.2 x $20) + (.6 x $50) + (.2 x $100) = $54.
30. (.4 x $20) + (.2 x $50) + (.4 x $90) = $54.
31. With both projects creditors have a 100% chance of being repaid the funds that are owed
to them. Project I's shareholders have an expected return of $34, as (.2 × $0) + (.6 × $30)
+ (.2 X $80) = $34. Project 2's shareholders also have an expected return of $34, as (.4 X
$0) + (.2 x $30) + (.4 x $70) = $34.
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Corporate law provides no guidance as to which of these two projects should
be selected, even where shareholder wealth maximization is the goal, because
the second project offers both greater upside potential and greater risk to the
shareholders. It is dear, however, that the choice between Project 1 and Project
2 is a matter of complete indifference to the firm's fixed claimants, because the
creditors will be repaid in full regardless of which of the two projects is chosen.
Thus, contrary to Professor Stout's assertions, finance theory also teaches
that increasing business risk does not always result in a diminution in the
value of a firm's fixed claims. There are many business decisions that increase
the value of a firm's equity claims without decreasing the value of the firm's
fixed claims. For example, suppose that the firm is offered a third project.
Pursuing this project also entails the firm selling $20 in fixed claims, but this
project has an expected value of $58. Project 3's expected value of $58 is
based on the assumption that there is a 40% chance the firm will earn $20, a
20% chance that the firm will earn $50, and a 40% chance that the firm will
earn $100 during the relevant time frame. 32 This project provides an expected
value of $20 for the firm's fixed claimants but a $38 expected return for the
firm's equity investors. 33
Just as the fixed claimants were indifferent between Project 1 and Project
2, they are also indifferent among the firm's choices of Project 3 or Projects 1
or 2. Professor Stout offers no reason for why a rational fixed claimant would
pay anything for the rights to participate in the decision about which of these
three projects to pursue.
Of course, Professor Stout might respond to this criticism by pointing
out that there are plenty of other projects that the firm might pursue that
transfer wealth from the fixed claimants to the equity claimants by increasing
the standard deviation of the expected returns in such a way as to lower the
probability that the creditors' claims will be repaid in full. This is true.
Creditors, however, can fully protect themselves from this risk by contract.
Not only can creditors refuse to extend credit, or charge very high rates of
interest to compensate themselves for the perceived risks of an investment,
they can also bargain for protections such as the conversion rights, which
allow them to convert their claims from fixed claims to equity claims, or put
option rights, which permit them to sell their fixed claims back to the firm
under contractually specified conditions.
32. (.4 x $20) + (.2 x $50) + (.4 x $100) = $58.
33. Project 3's creditors have a 00% chance of being repaid the funds that are owed to them.
Project 3's shareholders have an expected return of $38, as (.2 × $0) + (.2 × $30) + (.4 ×
$80) = $38.
HeinOnline  -- 3 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 187 2008
Virginia Law & Business Review
In other words, there are business decisions that simply do not involve
the fixed claimants, because there are business decisions in which the fixed
claimants do not have a stake. Because shareholders' only claims are residual
claims, all decisions made by the firm that affect either risk or return affect
the shareholders.
Most tellingly, while Professor Stout recognizes that business risks that
increase the expected value of the equitv interests may reduce the value of a
firm's fixed claims, she does not appear to recognize that the reverse is true.
Business risks that increase the value of a firm's fixed claims (that is, by
reducing risk) reduce the value of a firm's equity claims. For example,
suppose that a firm embarked on Project 4, in which there was a 90% chance
that the firm would make $100 during the relevant time period, but a 10%
chance that the firm would go bankrupt and be able to return only half of the
$20 owed to creditors. This investment would have an expected value of $91,
including $72 for the shareholders and $19 for the creditors. 34 Suppose
further that the firm was choosing between this project and an alternative
Project 5 with a 100% chance of returning $50 at the end of the relevant
investment period. This alternative project would have a value of $20 for
creditors but only $30 for the shareholders. 35
It is true that if equity claimants gained control of a company that was
pursuing the project with the $50 expected value (100% chance of $50), they
would quickly shift the firm's resources to the alternative project that reduced
the value of the fixed claims by nine percent, or from $100 to $91. It is also
true, however, that if the fixed claimants somehow obtained control of a
company that was pursuing the project with the $91 expected value, they would
quickly steer the firm in the direction of the project with the $50 expected
value, which would increase the expected value of their claims from $19 to $20.
Thus, what we actually know by combining corporate finance with the
Coase Theorem is the following. First, one cannot determine whether fixed
claimants' interests are being sacrificed for the benefit of equint claimants or
whether the reverse is happening unless one knows the baseline
understanding of the parties when they made their initial investments. If the
parties invested thinking that the firm would pursue Project 4, a shift to
Project 5 would benefit the firm's shareholders and harm the firm's fixed
claimants. On the other hand, if the parties invested thinking that the firm
34. (.1 X $10) + (.9 X $100) = $91. Project 4 will have an expected return of $19 for creditors,
as (.1 X $10) + (.9 X $20) + (.4 $80) - $19. It will have an expected return of $72 for
shareholders, as (.1 x $0) + (.9 x 80) - $72.
35. 1.0 x $50 = $50. This Project will have an expected return of $20 for creditors, as 1.0 X
$20 = $20. It will have an expected return of $30 for shareholders, as 1.0 X $30 = $30.
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would pursue Project 5, a shift to Project 4 would benefit the firm's fixed
claimants and harm the firm's shareholders. Without knowing the original
understanding of the parties, we simply do not know who is ripping off whom.
Second, from a societal perspective, legal rules should be organized to (a)
cause the firm to internalize fully the costs of its operations; and, having done
that, (b) pursue the projects that maximize the overall value of the firm. Thus,
as between Project 4 and Project 5, the firm clearly should pursue Project 4,
which maximizes economic output and societal wealth. Fixed claimants can
easily be compensated for moving from Project 5 to Project 4, because
Project 5 is only worth $50 ($20 for the fixed claimants and $30 for the
shareholders), while Project 4 is worth $91 ($19 for the fixed claimants and
$72 for the shareholders). Thus, both classes of claimants, fixed and residual,
could be made better off by a move from Project 5 to Project 4, accompanied
by a side-payment from the equity claimants to the fixed claimants of some
amount greater than $1 but less than $42.36
Third, while fixed claimants may sometimes have an incentive to
maximize the value of the firm, shareholders, as the residual claimants, always
have the incentive to maximize the value of the firm. Thus, shareholders, not
creditors, should be put in charge of making the marginal decisions that affect
the overall value of the firm (subject, of course, to the abilit of the fixed
claimants to protect themselves through the contracting process).
These are the default rules in corporate law, subject to modification by
the various participants in the corporate enterprise, of course. The single,
uniform measure of wealth to be maximized is the overall value of the firm,
and the shareholders are in the best position to do this, subject to the
possibility of making side bargains with other constituencies.
CONCLUSION
As a narrow legal matter, Dodge v. Ford stands for the proposition that if a
CEO testifies that he and his board were engaging in certain actions for
reasons unrelated to maximizing shareholder value, they would lose a lawsuit
challenging those actions, especially if they exhibited indifference to the
interests of those shareholders.3 On the other hand, if the CEO engaged in
36. On the other hand, there is no way for the fixed claimants to pay the shareholders to
move from Project 4 to Project 5, because the gains to the fixed claimants ($1) are much
smaller than the losses to the equity claimants ($61).
37. For a modern version of Doge z'. Ford, see Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517
A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986), another case -whose outcome turns on the CEO's motivation
for taking a particular corporate action and in -which the CEO lost merely because he
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precisely the same actions but claimed that doing so was for the purpose of
maximizing shareholder value, they would win the same lawsuit.
In other words, I agree with Professor Stout's essential claim that the
corporate law principle of wealth maximization for shareholders as articulated
and enforced in Dodge v. Ford is a rule that is hardly ever enforced by courts.
Professor Stout and I disagree, however, about the reason why this is the
case. Professor Stout attributes the lack of other cases like Doge v. Ford to the
fact that the legal rule articulated in the case is not good law.38 Perhaps this is
true, but I do not think so.
In my view, the holding in Dodge v. Ford is attributable to the fact that the
rule of wealth maximization for shareholders is virtually impossible to enforce
as a practical matter. The rule is aspirational, except in odd cases. As long as
corporate directors and CEOs claim to be maximizing profits for
shareholders, they will be taken at their word, because it is impossible to
refute these corporate officials' self-serving assertions about their motives.
Nonetheless, fully understanding the futility of the holding in Dodge v. Ford
can provide an interesting and important lesson about the ability of corporate
law to provide much of value to investors.
Doge v. Ford is a great metaphor for the complex and gargantuan mass of
corporate law that has been piling up on the legal landscape at both the state
and federal level since the beginning of the twentieth century. While these
rules undoubtedly enrich the platoons of corporate lawyers who plan for and
litigate with corporations, they do not do much for shareholders.
implied (indeed expressed) "threats" to oppose certain transactions that "could be
determined by the board to be in the best interests of all the stockholders." Id. at 278.
38. See Stout, supra note 1, at 165.
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